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The rise of the bounded state as a political unit necessitated a concern with 
the drawing and redrawing of political borders and the formalisation of 
territorial arrangements. Events such as the Congresses of Vienna and Berlin 
in the 19th century represented attempts by political leaders of the world’s 
major powers and their representatives to apportion territory to states and to 
(re)draw the borders between them (Blacksell, 2006). The interest of the 
‘great powers’ in this was hardly neutral. Rather they considered larger 
strategic interests. In the words of Lord Curzon, British viceroy in India at the 
start of the 20th century:  
 
“Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia – to many these words 
breathe only a sense of utter remoteness, or a memory of strange 
vicissitudes and of moribund romance. To me I confess they are pieces 
on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the 
domination of the world”  
(cited in Kleveman 2003, p3).  
 
Subsequently Curzon, by then British Foreign Secretary, was involved in the 
post-World War 1 repartitioning of Europe at the conference of Versailles. At 
that same conference US geographer Isaiah Bowman, as part of the US 
delegation, was similarly instrumental in the reconfiguring of Europe’s internal 
borders (Smith, 2003). While considerations of physical features (such as 
rivers and mountain ranges as ‘natural’ frontiers) and cultural characteristics 
of populations entered into such decisions, these major conferences can 
primarily be read as responses to the geo-strategic considerations of the 
larger powers.  
 
Traditionally political geographers have had an interest in borders. In the past 
much of this did not extend far beyond classifying borders as natural or 
artificial. This classification in itself is of course flawed and misleading in that 
borders are social and political constructs. The decision to make the Rio 
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Grande a political boundary between the USA and Mexico was the result of 
human decisions, interactions and conflicts. This academic study of borders, 
like the geopolitical reasoning of politicians, tended to be detached from the 
lives of people ‘on the ground’. Generally those whose lives were most 
directly effected by the emergence, disappearance or shifting of borders often 
had little if any voice within the process of demarcation. Regardless of 
whether borders are based on physical, ethno-cultural or strategic criteria they 
are not just lines on a map, they are social and discursive constructs which 
reflect political strategies and ideologies. They can have important 
implications for people’s lives and, for some, borders, their existence, their 
location and their accompanying political paraphernalia can have serious 
ramifications, both materially and psychologically. One such illustration of the 
personal consequences of the imposition of ‘hard’ borders (in this case the 
Cold War divide between East and West Germany) is provided by Oliver 
August. 
 
“My father had been fourteen when the war ended and the Allies drew a 
line across his father’s tree nursery. The main house was in the Soviet 
zone while some of the fields were in the British zone. The border 
literally divided the property. Aged seventeen, my father hid a suitcase 
on a horse-drawn cart and drove west across the border on family 
property, leaving his parents behind. In the following forty years he was 
allowed to return only twice – for a maximum of three hours each time – 
for their funerals” 
(1999, p3). 
 
While not all borders have such serious personal consequences they do 
nevertheless commonly cut through towns, farms, even individual houses. 
While their socially constructed nature may be obvious, it is equally apparent 
that they have come to assume a huge significance for people, particularly 
those who live in border zones. Borders are contested and they give rise to 
radically different narratives. For some the border is welcome and acts as a 
barrier separating residents from the ‘other’ beyond the boundary. For others 
they are ‘scars’ on the landscape and act as barriers through which people 
endeavour to break through. For some they are there to protect against 
external threat while for others they are impediments locking them out of 
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certain spaces. Beyond the immediate material circumstances of individuals, 
they contribute to the formation, solidification or fracturing of place-based 
identities.  
 
The significance of these barriers may continue long after their material 
manifestations have disappeared. Though the Berlin Wall has fallen and 
Germany has been a unified country for many years, ‘east’ and ‘west’ 
Germans continue to distinguish themselves from each other. Cultural 
prejudices are quite deeply embedded and stereotypical views of the ‘other’ 
mean that Wessis (west Germans) are commonly caricatured as arrogant 
while Ossis (east Germans) are portrayed as lazy. Once they come into being 
borders may become deeply entrenched, psychologically as well as 
physically. The fall of communism has not necessarily eliminated border 
mentalities (Meinhof, 2002)  
 
It is commonly asserted that we live in a globalising world where bounded 
spaces are being replaced by spaces of flows as capital, labour, information, 
ideas run freely around the world. This gravitation towards a ‘global village’ is 
seen to be driven by, amongst other things, the collapse of political ideologies, 
the rise of neo-liberal socio-economic systems and the increasing erosion of 
cultural differences. These various processes are facilitated by the growth of 
modern communications technologies, most notably the internet, and cheaper 
and more accessible modes of long distance transport. This leads to 
assertions of the end of Geography, the irrelevance of place and the demise 
of the nation-state as a meaningful political construct. Hence, it is suggested 
borders are increasingly porous and anachronistic. However, this 
interpretation seems somewhat off the mark. It might be equally valid to see 
the present era characterised by the proliferation and maintenance of borders 
impeding the movement of some groups. The collapse of the Berlin wall and 
fall of the iron curtain, the expansion of the ‘borderless’ EU and more ‘local’ 
events such as the Northern Irish peace process (and the removal of much of 
the military infrastructure associated with the Irish border) implies a lessening 
of the significance of boundaries. This however, is to ignore a series of 
processes which have precisely the reverse effect.   
 3
 The break-up of the Soviet Union and collapse of communism heralded a 
drive for ethno-national separation as groups sought to lay claim to their own 
territories and political spaces. In turn this has given rise to claims for yet 
more ethno-national separation. Parts of Russia, most notably Chechnya, 
wish to secede but even in comparatively small states such as Georgia, 
separatist movements have arisen claiming independence for Abkhazia and 
Adzharia. The collapse of communism, rather than hastening the demise of 
the state, has in fact resulted in the creation of many more. Far from the 
removal of borders there has been a hasty rush to erect yet more. Nowhere 
has this been more noticeable (and costly) than in the former Yugoslavia 
where ethnic cleansing resulted from attempts to ‘purify’ space. The violent 
conflicts which erupted in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo centred on 
groups trying to eradicate other ethnic groups from ‘their’ territory. This strategy 
was built on an essentialist version of defining ethno-national identity and, quite 
literally, clearing the territory of those possessing a different identity. In order to 
try to end violent conflict within Bosnia-Herzegovina, negotiators constructed 
maps on which territory was designated ‘Serb’ ‘Muslim’ ‘Croatian’ etc. with lines 
dividing towns and cities into different zones. The Dayton Agreement of 1995 
divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into two autonomous units; a Muslim-Croat 
Federation and a Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska). This internal 
division, while in some respects an attempt to resolve ethno-national tension, 
can also be interpreted as essentialising identities and (unintentionally) 
legitimating and reinforcing the territorial, ethnic and political divisions it was 
designed to resolve (Campbell, 1999, Storey, 2002). 
 
The European Union (EU) and its continued expansion has further contributed 
to arguments suggesting the state has had its day and to assertions of the 
arrival of a ‘borderless world’. The scaling down of internal checks at EU 
borders and the rhetoric of free movement of labour has obscured some 
issues. Firstly, internal divisions still exist.  The imposition by some western 
European member states of restrictions on the social welfare rights of 
immigrants from recent accession states in eastern Europe, reflects a sort of 
internal hierarchy with some migrants more welcome than others. Secondly, 
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while the EU’s internal borders may be of less significance (though far from 
irrelevant) the outer perimeter is becoming ever more impermeable (at least 
for some). For some time there has been much debate within the EU aimed at 
refining a common immigration policy. Immigrants from some countries are 
clearly more welcome than others. Debates over who Europe should allow in 
are thrown into stark relief by the sight of the bodies of African migrants 
washed ashore on the tourist beaches of the Canaries and mainland Spain. 
That people are willing to take such risks in the first place reminds us of the 
huge gulf between rich and poor and of Europe’s relative affluence. 
Intriguingly Europe’s borders extend into north Africa. Ceuta and Melilla are 
Spanish exclaves in Morocco and border fences now surround these zones 
designed to keep Africans out of ‘Fortress Europe’. Elsewhere, the EU border 
has simply shifted eastwards with Poland’s eastern border with Ukraine and 
Belarus now the ‘front line’ rather than its western border with Germany. The 
fall of the Berlin Wall has not put an end to these divisions. Far from it; instead 
ever higher barriers continue to appear (Klein 2002).  
 
Beyond Europe, under the guise of security, Israel constructs a wall to keep 
Palestinians in place, Morocco builds one in Western Sahara, while walls 
appear in Tijuana, Nogales, El Paso and other cities along the US-Mexican 
border designed to contain northward migration. In this latter case as well as 
US border patrols vigilante-type organisations like the Minuteman Project 
monitor the border for illegal immigration. In the early 21st century we live in a 
world which “simultaneously presents the younger generation with doors wide 
open to the world via cable TV, and with doors shut tight to impede illegal 
migration” (Ugarteche, 2000, p1). 
 
Borders are unequally permeable; some can cross relatively easily, for others 
it is much more difficult. Some can cross with relative freedom while others 
meet with interrogation, suspicion and hostility. Who you are and what you are 
remain important. A US or European citizen moves from San Diego to Tijuana 
with relative ease but for Mexicans going the other way, the story is rather 
different. Generally we think of our own right to move freely across national 
frontiers but we may be less well disposed towards others having a similar 
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right. If you are an EU passport holder the chances are you pass relatively 
quickly through immigration channels in most countries. If you are not then 
you are more likely to find yourself queuing and being interrogated as to your 
reasons for travel, length of stay etc.  While tourists and jet setting business 
people are generally seen as ‘good’ travellers’ those seeking political asylum 
or fleeing oppressive circumstances (or those simply trying to better 
themselves) are viewed in a much more suspicious way. Attitudes towards 
mobility are highly contingent on who is doing the moving. As Hayter suggests 
“migration for economic betterment, rather than being considered … a sign of 
enterprise and courage, is now regarded as criminal and shameful” (2000, p64), 
though we might add that Europeans and North Americans bettering themselves 
appears quite acceptable but people from Africa and Asia endeavouring to do so 
is another matter. During the colonial period European settlers tended to act as 
though they had an automatic right not only to reside in faraway places, but also 
to control them. Essentially European colonisers were economic migrants. 
Current TV programmes promote the idea of people retiring to Spain and buying 
property in north Africa or eastern Europe. This is presented in a generally 
unproblematic way. However, the idea that people in Romania or Tunisia might 
make their way here tends to be viewed somewhat differently. Those in richer 
countries have traditionally viewed their own migratory movements as a natural 
right while simultaneously restricting the movement of those from poorer areas. 
We continue to live in a highly unequal world characterized by Bauman as 
one of tourists and vagabonds where “the tourists travel because they want 
to; the vagabonds because they have no other bearable choice” (1998, p94).  
 
The demonisation of those who cross ‘our’ borders reveals itself in many 
ways. Much is made of the Polish plumbers occupying a particular 
occupational niche in London and elsewhere but we hear much less about the 
expatriate business people from western European countries working in 
Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava and Bucharest as eastern European economies 
are ‘opened up’ for external investment. It seems that Ryanair and Easyjet 
can take ‘us’ there but ‘them’ coming ‘here’ is a different matter, as though 
borders should somehow be one-way. Meanwhile ludicrous newspaper 
headlines bemoan the manner in which ‘foreign’ languages are spoken in 
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Britain and Ireland and an entire way of life is alleged to be under threat. Apart 
from the racist, xenophobic and inaccurate nature of such claims, they also 
make the mistake of assuming a fixed and essential identity in the first place. 
Sadly, Ireland despite its emigrant history, seems happy to join in the clamour 
to make it more difficult for migrants (Crowley et al, 2006 ). History is ignored 
as we become the border guards rather than those trying to creep through, as 
we ‘protect’ ourselves from what we once were.  
 
Borders have always been associated with ideas of security and defence and 
in contemporary political discourses we see issues of mobility and migration 
conflated with ideas of terrorism, criminality and security. Some of the 
discourses about refugees and asylum-seekers either explicitly or implicitly 
conflate a range of issues and associate migration with criminality and the war 
on terror. This was exemplified by some newspaper coverage in the aftermath 
of the July 2005 London bombings. In a crude way, a very diverse range of 
people from a wide variety of different places are collectively labelled a threat 
and are viewed with deep suspicion. Such perspectives demonise asylum-
seekers and effectively criminalise those seeking refuge. Security 
paraphernalia, stricter legislation, overt attempts at restriction and policing of 
migration reflect an ever more hostile environment for those seeking to cross 
borders. Politicians speak of the need to secure state borders in a way which 
implies that migrants present some major threat. While on the one hand public 
sympathy is garnered for those whose lives have been badly affected through 
political turmoil, such sympathy seems to evaporate when those people turn 
up ‘here’. While many may evince a humanitarian concern for those seen to 
be poor and living in impoverished circumstances, there appears to be a 
strong sense that such people should remain in ‘their place’ rather than 
coming ‘here’. 
 
Even when international borders are successfully crossed, more micro-scale 
fences appear. The disaffected youth of the banlieues of Paris (many of 
immigrant origin) are both physically separate and socially distant from the 
heart of the city cut-off by a ring road (the périphérique) from the centre and 
isolated from each other (Morley, 2000). For them, as for those trying to cross 
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international frontiers the world is far from borderless but rather “has nothing 
but borders that cannot be crossed” (Ugarteche, 2000, p5).  Although Europe 
may wish to see itself as a borderless entity, both here and elsewhere borders 
continue to divide. Those who have the means and the power to do so erect 
fences to exclude the undesirable from their space. As Homi Bhabha 
memorably put it: 
 
“The globe shrinks for those who own it, (but) for the displaced or the 
dispossessed, the migrant or refugee, no distance is more awesome 
than the few feet across borders or frontiers”  
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